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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
Nos. 14-1337 and 14-1502

IN RE: DIET DRUGS (PHENTERMINE/FENFLURAMINE/DEXFENFLURAMINE)
PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION

RANDALL D. HERMAN; RAYNA HERMAN,
Appellants in 14-1337
MICHAEL HIRSCHBEIN; SANDRA HIRSCHBEIN,
Appellants in 14-1502

On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D. C. Nos. 2-99-cv-20593 and 2-16-md-01203)
District Judge: Honorable Harvey Bartle, III

Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
on September 9, 2014
Before: SMITH, SHWARTZ and ROTH, Circuit Judges
(Filed: February 20, 2015)

O P I N I O N*

ROTH, Circuit Judge:
*

This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.

Randall Herman and Michael Hirschbein (collectively, Claimants) appeal from the
District Court’s orders, denying their claims for Matrix A, Level III benefits under the
Diet Drug Nationwide Class Action Settlement Agreement. We will affirm.
I.
Herman and Hirschbein are members of the certified settlement class who seek
benefits under the Settlement Agreement. We have previously discussed the litigation
background, Settlement Agreement terms, and significant medical issues.1 Thus, we
limit our discussion here to the facts relevant to the present appeal.
In 2011, Herman and Hirschbein submitted claims for Matrix A, Level III benefits
under the Settlement Agreement. The AHP Settlement Trust then submitted both claims
for audit. The Trust subsequently denied Herman’s claim and limited Hirschbein’s claim
to Matrix B benefits. Specifically, the Trust credited the findings of the auditing
cardiologists, who determined there was no reasonable basis for Herman’s treating
physician’s representation that he had mild aortic regurgitation or Hirschbein’s treating
physician’s representation that he did not have aortic stenosis. Herman and Hirschbein
both contested the Trust’s post-audit determinations but the Trust affirmed its decisions.
Both claimants again disputed the Trust’s findings and the Trust applied to the
District Court to require them to show cause why their claims should be paid. The
District Court referred the matters to the Special Master, who appointed a Technical
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See In re Diet Drugs (Phentermine/Fenfluramine/Dexfenfluramine) Prods. Liab. Litig.,
543 F.3d 179, 181-90 (3d Cir. 2008).
2

Advisor to prepare an independent report. Like the auditing cardiologists, the Technical
Advisor concluded that there was no reasonable basis for the representation that Herman
had mild aortic regurgitation or that Hirschbein did not have aortic stenosis. Crediting
the Technical Advisor and auditing cardiologists’ findings, the District Court determined
that both claimants failed to meet their burden of establishing a reasonable medical basis
for their claims. Thus, the District Court affirmed the denial of Herman and Hirschbein’s
claims for Matrix A, Level III benefits.
II.2
“We review a District Court’s exercise of its equitable authority to administer and
implement a class action settlement for abuse of discretion.”3 To constitute an abuse of
discretion, the District Court must have relied on a “clearly erroneous finding of fact, an
errant conclusion of law or an improper application of law to fact.”4 “The test is not what
this court would have done under the same circumstances; that is not enough.”5
Construction of settlement agreements, however, is a question of law mandating plenary
review.6
As a preliminary matter, Claimants seek plenary review because they claim that
the threshold issue in this appeal is defining the term “reasonable medical basis.”
According to Claimants, the District Court has not provided a rule of law or standard for
2

The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1), and we exercise
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
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See In re Diet Drugs, 543 F.3d at 184 n.10.
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In re Orthopedic Bone Screw Prods. Liab. Litig., 246 F.3d 315, 320 (3d Cir. 2001).
5
Id. (quotations omitted).
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In re Diet Drugs (Phentermine/Fenfluramine/Dexfenfluramine) Prods. Liab. Litig., 706
F.3d 217, 223 n.4 (3d Cir. 2013).
3

determining whether a reasonable medical basis exists. We disagree. The District Court
has applied the reasonable medical basis standard in a litany of past decisions, and those
opinions are an appropriate place for guidance here.7 Although these decisions do not
provide a one-size-fits-all definition, they offer Claimants “sufficient notice of the
reasonable medical basis standard.”8 As a result, we consider only whether the District
Court abused its discretion by finding that Claimants failed to meet their burden of
establishing a reasonable medical basis for their claims.
The District Court did not abuse its discretion in holding that Herman failed to
rebut the opinions of the auditing cardiologist and the Technical Advisor that he did not
have mild regurgitation. In large part, Herman stands on his own physicians’
affirmations, which disagree with those findings. Disagreement, however, is not enough
to constitute an abuse of discretion.9 Herman also argues that he met his burden by
submitting an aortic regurgitation measurement based on more than a single frame and
including some indication of the maximum jet’s representativeness. Yet, Herman relies
on a prior decision in this litigation, where we merely stated that the “identification of a
single jet without any explanation or indication of its representativeness will not satisfy
the claimant’s burden.”10 Claimants next claim that the auditing cardiologist’s findings
were unreasonable because they did not include regurgitation measurements. But
quantitative measurement is unnecessary where, as here, an auditing cardiologist
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See, e.g., Pretrial Order No. 2640, Pretrial Order No. 2825.
See In re Diet Drugs, 543 F.3d at 187 n.16.
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See In re Orthopedic Bone Screw Prods., 246 F.3d at 320.
10
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indicates that regurgitation is well below the necessary threshold.11 Furthermore,
Herman mischaracterizes the auditing cardiologist’s method for measuring Herman’s
aortic regurgitation, and therefore Herman does not demonstrate that the cardiologist’s
approach departed from accepted medical standards.
Nor did the District Court abuse its discretion in determining that Hirschbein
failed to rebut the opinions of the auditing cardiologist and the Technical Advisor that he
had aortic stenosis. As with Herman’s claim, Claimants mistakenly argue that the
opinions of Hirschbein’s treating physicians are enough to compel reversal here. They
are not. Similarly, Claimants argue that the District Court abused its discretion by not
considering the representative measurements by Hirschbein’s treating physicians. But
the District Court conducted an extensive review of the record, and simply chose to credit
different findings. Lastly, Claimants’ arguments regarding the reliability of the Technical
Advisor’s findings are misplaced.
III.
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.
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See id. at 188-89.
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